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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900144-CA 
v. : 
MARK RAYMOND DASTRUP, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a denial of a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea to ten counts of forgery, second degree felonies, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), seven counts of 
theft, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (1990), and one count of theft, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court, in and for Sevier County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the taking of defendant's guilty plea conform with 
legal requirements? A reviewing court "will not interfere with a 
trial judge's determination that a defendant has failed to show 
good cause [for withdrawal of a guilty plea] unless it clearly 
appears that the trial judge abused his discretion." State v. 
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann- § 77-35-11(e) (Supp. 1988) (amended 
1989, repealed eff. July 1, 1990J.1 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest and shall not accept 
such a plea until the court has made the 
findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a 
jury trial and to confront and cross-
examine in open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea he 
waives all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement 
and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea 
to a lesser included offense, or the 
Effective April 24, 1989, former rule 11(e) was redesignated as 
rule 11(5). Although defendant cites rule 11(e) and rule 11(5) 
interchangeably throughout his brief, to avoid confusion the 
State will cite to rule 11(e), the rule in effect at the time 
defendant entered his guilty plea. 
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dismissal of other charges, the same shall be 
approved by the court. If recommendations as 
to sentence are allowed by the court, the 
court shall advise the defendant personally 
that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 7, 1989, defendant was charged with 106 counts 
of forgery and theft (R. 1-28). The same day an amended 
information was filed charging defendant with ten counts of 
forgery, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), seven counts of theft, all second degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), and 
one count of theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 39-44). On March 8, 1989, 
defendant pleaded guilty to all 18 counts (transcript of 
arraignment proceeding [hereinafter MT.,f] 11-15). Defendant was 
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 1 year nor more than 
15 years at the Utah State Prison on each of the second degree 
felony counts, and a term not to exceed 5 years in the Utah State 
Prison on the third degree felony theft count, all sentences to 
be served concurrently (transcript of sentencing proceeding 
[hereinafter MT.A.M] 18-19). 
On August 1, 1989, defendant filed a request for 
withdrawal of guilty plea (R. 61-63). A hearing on defendant's 
motion was held February 7, 1990, and the trial court denied 
defendant's motion on that date (transcript of hearing on motion 
to withdraw guilty plea [hereinafter "T.B."] 8). Defendant filed 
his notice of appeal on March 8, 1990 (R. 104-105). 
-3-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 8, 1989, defendant entered a guilty plea to 
ten counts of forgery, all second degree felonies, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), seven counts of theft, all 
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1990), and one count of theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (T. 11-15) (a copy 
of the transcript of the arraignment [guilty plea hearing] is 
2 
attached hereto as Addendum A). 
At the arraignment proceeding the trial court asked 
defendant his age, educational level and ability to read and 
write the English language (T. 3); whether defendant was under 
the influence of alcohol or narcotics or was suffering from any 
mental illness (T. 4); and whether defendant had any questions as 
to his constitutional rights enumerated by the court, including 
the right to representation by counsel, the right to a speedy 
trial by an impartial jury, the right of confrontation and cross 
examination, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to obtain witnesses in his defense, the right to a 
unanimous verdict by the jury in order to secure a conviction, 
and the right to appeal (T. 5-6). In addition, the trial judge 
questioned defendant as to whether the plea was made absent 
threats or promises (T. 7); whether defendant actually committed 
At the time of filing of this brief, an original certified copy 
of the arraignment transcript was not available. The State used 
a copy of the transcript, received from defendant, for the 
preparation of its brief. Joseph Liddell, court reporter, will 
certify an original and submit it to this Court. The State 
trusts that the original, as so submitted, will be the same as 
Addendum A. 
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the forgeries and thefts set out in the amended information (T. 
9-10); and whether defendant understood that the court, and not 
the attorneys, determined the penalty that would be assessed (T. 
10). The trial court informed defendant of the minimum and 
maximum penalties that could be imposed (T. 4-5). The court was 
also made aware that the plea had been negotiated and 
specifically stated that it would not accept the plea unless 
defendant admitted that he had actually committed the crimes as 
set forth in the amended information (T. 9). Defendant, when 
asked by the court if he wanted the court to accept the plea 
bargain, responded affirmatively (Id.). 
After defendant had responded to the questions to the 
satisfaction of the trial court, defendant signed an affidavit in 
support of his plea and entered guilty pleas to all 18 counts in 
the amended information (T. 9, 11-15) (a copy of defendant's 
affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum B). The trial court 
specifically found that defendant was advised of his 
constitutional rights and that defendant had made a voluntary and 
intelligent plea (T. 11). 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea defendant declined to testify. His attorney argued that 
defendant's trial attorney had a conflict at the time he 
represented defendant (T.B. 3-4), that defendant had been denied 
equal protection of the law (T.B. 4-5) and that the trial court 
had not strictly complied with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, pursuant to the requirements of State v. Gibbons, 740 
P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), in the taking of defendant's plea (T.B. 
5). The trial court summarily denied defendant's motion (T.B. 8). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea because the record shows that 
defendant's plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
made. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
On appeal defendant asserts three bases for reversing 
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. First, defendant states that the court did not comply with 
rule 11(e)(2), in that the record did not indicate that defendant 
specifically stated that his plea was voluntary. Second, 
defendant asserts that the court did not comply with the rule 
11(e)(3) requirement that he know that by entering his plea he 
was waiving certain constitutional rights. Third, he claims that 
the record did not reflect that he understood the nature and 
elements of the offenses to which he entered a plea and that a 
guilty plea was an admission of those elements, as required by 
rule 11(e)(4). In presenting these arguments defendant relies on 
this Court's interpretation of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987), as replacing the previous "record as a whole" test 
with an on-the-record "strict compliance" test in assessing the 
validity of a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Vasilacopulos, 
756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988); State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 
August 24, 1990); State v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah 
Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990). If this Court applies an on-the-record 
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11
 strict compliance" test to the instant case, it can readily 
conclude that defendant's first and third allegations are without 
merit. 
With regard to defendant's first allegation of error, 
the trial court specifically found that defendant's plea was 
voluntary, as required by rule 11(e)(2) (T. 11). On its face 
rule 11 requires only a finding by the court of voluntariness, 
not that a defendant specifically state that his plea is 
voluntary. In support of that finding, the trial court, on two 
occasions, told defendant that the court's role was to be sure 
his plea was voluntary (T. 4, 7.) The trial court also asked 
whether defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
whether defendant was suffering from mental illness and whether 
defendant had been threatened (Ici.). Defendant's responses 
satisfied the court, and its finding that the plea was voluntary 
is both supported by the record and in strict compliance with 
rule 11, as required by this Court. 
Defendant's third contention, that he did not 
understand the nature and the elements of the offenses and that 
his plea was an admission of those elements, is meritless. At 
the defendant's arraignment he testified that he had finished 
grade 12 in school and could read and write the English language 
(T.3). Thereafter, the amended information, charging him with 
ten counts of forgery and eight counts of theft, was handed to 
defendant and read aloud in its entirety (T. 4). The statutory 
elements of each count were included in that information as well 
as a statement of the facts relating the statutory elements of 
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the offenses to defendant's case (see amended information, R. 39-
44, attached hereto as Addendum C). Before accepting defendant's 
plea the trial court and defendant had the following exchange: 
Q [trial court] Now, Mr, Dastrup, do you 
admit that you committed the forgeries, as 
set forth in the amended information, and 
committed the thefts on the dates, as set 
forth in the amended information? 
A [defendant] Yes, sir. 
(T. 9-10). The reading of each count and the elements thereof 
and defendant's admission to having committed the acts giving 
rise to the charges, in open court, satisfy any rule 11(e)(4) 
challenge. 
Defendant's second allegation, that the trial court did 
not specifically inform him that by entering a guilty plea he was 
waiving certain constitutional rights, is technically true. 
However, the trial court did inform defendant of his specific 
constitutional rights against compulsory self-incrimination, to a 
trial by an impartial jury and to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against him as required by rule 11(e)(3) (T. 6). See 
Boykin v. Alabama 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1968) (waiver of federal 
constitutional rights when a guilty plea is entered in a state 
criminal case includes the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to a trial by jury and the right to 
confront one's accusers). Although the trial court did not ask 
defendant on the record whether he understood that he was waiving 
those rights by pleading guilty, the manner in which the trial 
court explained those rights certainly reflects the fact that 
defendant knew he would not be exercising those rights by 
pleading guilty. Moreover, defendant executed an affidavit in 
support of his plea and initialed, as having read, a paragraph 
explaining that he was waiving his statutory and constitutional 
rights (see statement of defendant, paragraph 12., R. 51). The 
record clearly reflects that defendant knew the rights he was 
waiving. 
In the event that this Court finds defendant's second 
allegation meritorious, the State urges that the record as a 
whole standard be applied to find that defendant was properly 
apprised that he was waiving his constitutional rights in 
entering his plea. Although the State is aware of this Court's 
recent decisions concerning withdrawals of guilty pleas, it will 
continue to assert that Gibbons did not substantively change the 
rule on such cases. Consequently, the State has several cases 
pending before the Utah Supreme Court on this issue and will 
continue to urge that this Court reconsider its on-the-record 
3 
"strict compliance" portion. Application of the record as a 
whole test would clearly support the trial court's finding that 
defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily made and its 
subsequent denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
The case of State v. Hoff, No. 90096, was argued before the 
Utah Supreme Court on November 14, 1990. The State has filed or 
is in the process of filing petitions for writ of certiorari in 
Gentry, Pharris, State v. Powell, No. 900202-CA (Utah Ct. App. 
Oct. 24, 1990), and State v. Maquire No. 900045-CA (Utah Ct. App. 
Nov. 16, 1990) (copy of the Gentry petition is attached hereto 
and incorporated herein as Addendum D). Although the State 
concedes that in light of the cases, this Court is unlikely to 
retreat from its conclusion that the record as a whole test no 
longer governs, it believes that continued argument on this point 
is necessary to preserve the issue for possible certiorari 
review. 
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plea. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. 
DATED this 10— day of J/ICJM^ ^ ^ , 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
iZtyJ 
DITH S. H. ATHERTON 
sistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage pre-paid to 
Shelden R. Carter, Harris, Carter & Harrison, 3325 N. University 
Ave., Ste. 200, Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg., Provo, UT 
84604, this / Z, day of l/PCJLs** U^ # 1990. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SEVIER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MARK RAYMOND DASTRUP 
Defendant. 
CRIMINAL NO. 1165 
ARRAIGNMENT 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of March 1989, 
commencing at 10:00 a.m., that the above entitled matter came 
on regularly before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court in and for the County of Sevier, 
State of Utah, at the Sevier County Courthouse, Richfield, 
Utah; 
That on the 7th day of September, 1989, Mrs. Lisa 
Dastrup requested a copy of the above entitled TRANSCRIPT OF 
PROCEEDINGS and that TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS appears herein 
as follows: 
J. M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPR 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT REPORTER 
SANPETE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
MANTI, UTAH 84642 
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For the Plaintiff: R. DON BROWN 
SEVIER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Sevier County Courthouse 
Richfield, UT 84701 
For the Defendant: LAWRENCE H. HUNT 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. Box 310 
Richfield, UT 84701 
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10:00 A.M. 
8TH MARCH 1989 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: The next matter is No. 1165. State of 
Utah vs. Mark Raymond Dastrup. Mr. Brou/n and Mr. Hunt. Is 
Mr. Dastrup present? 
MR. HUNT: He is, Your Honor. 
ARRAIGNMENT 
THE COURT: The record should indicate that Mark 
Raymond Dastrup is present, personally. He's represented by 
his Attorney, Mr. Lawrence H. Hunt. The State of Utah is 
present represented by Mr. R. Don Brown. The matter's before 
the Court for arraignment purposes. 
Is your true and correct name Mark Raymond Dastrup? 
MR. DASTRUP: A Yes, sir. It is. 
Q How old are you, sir? 
A 26. 
Q How far did you go through school? 
A Through grade 12, high school. 
Q Do you read and write the English language? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Have you had an opportunity to talk with your 
Attorney this morning? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you need any additional time to talk to him 
before I go forward with this arraignment? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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A No. 
Q Are you under the influence of alcohol or narcotics 
or suffering any mental illness? 
A No. 
Q At this time, Mr. Dastrup, I'll hand you a copy of 
the document entitled Amended Information and hand your 
Counsel a copy and I'll ask the Clerk to read the Amended 
Information. 
[INFORMATION READ] 
THE COURT: The record should indicate that the 
information has been read, u/ith a copy delivered to the 
Defendant. 
Nou/ Mr. Dastrup, it's my duty to advise you of your 
constitutional rights, advise you of the consequence of the 
matter before the Court, make sure you understand them, and 
it's my duty to obtain a voluntary plea from you. So you 
listen to me carefully, and if you have any questions, don't 
hesitate to stop me and I'll ansu/er them. 
You're being charged u/ith 18jdifferent crimes. 
They're either forgery or theft. Forgery is a crime 
punishable—and this is count No. 1—is a crime and a felony 
in the second degree. A felony in the second degree, 
according to the lau/s of the State of Utah, is punishable by aN 
term of not less than 1 nor more than 15 years in the Utah 
25 State Prison, or a fine up to $10,000, or both fine and 
1 
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imprisonment. 
Count No. 2 is theft, a felony in the third degree. 
A felony in the third degree is punishable by a term not to 
exceed 5 years in the Utah State Prison, or a fine up to 
$5,000, or both. 
Count 3 is theft, a felony in the second degree, 
which is u/hat I've indicated. Count 4 is theft, a felony in 
the second degree; Count 5 is theft, a felony in the second 
degree; Count 6 is theft, a felony in the second degree; Count 
7 is theft, a felony in the second degree; Count 8 is theft, a 
felony in the second degree; Count 9, is theft, a felony in 
the second degree; Count 10 is forgery, a felony in the second 
degree, and Count 11 is forgery, a felony in the second 
degree; Count 12 is forgery, a felony in the second degree; 
Count 13 is forgery, a felony in the second degree; Count 14, 
Count 15, Count 16, Count 17, and Count 18 are all forgery, 
felonies in the second degree. 
Now, there being 18 different crimes, of course 
there's 18 different punishments and these punishments can 
either be consecutive or concurrent. That means they can 
either follow each other or they can be at the same time, 
depending upon the Court. So that's the consequence of the 
matter before the Court. 
You have certain constitutional rights in this 
Court. First, you're entitled to be represented by an 
PAGE 6 
1 || Attorney at every step in the proceedings, and you're 
2 II represented by Mr. Hunt at this time. 
3 You're entitled to a speedy trial by a impartial 
4 Jury. You're entitled to confront and have your Attorney 
5 cross examine in open Court any witnesses that appear against 
6 you. You have a privilege against compulsory self 
7 incrimination. That means you don't have to testify, if you 
8 don't desire to. You may stand mute and say nothing and the 
9 burden's still upon the State of Utah to prove you guilty, 
10 beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, if you desire to 
11 testify, you have that right. 
12 You have a right to compulsory process for obtaining 
13 witnesses in your defense. At the time of trial it requires a 
14 unanimous verdict by the Jury to convict you, and if you are 
15 convicted, you have the right to appeal the conviction to the 
16 Court of Appeals of the State of Utah. 
17 Now there are basically your constitutional rights. 
18 Mr. Hunt, have you advised him of these rights? 
19 MR. NUNT: I have, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: In your opinion, does he understand 
21 them? 
22 A I believe so. 
23 THE COURT: Do you have any questions you'd like to 
24 ask me, Mr. Dastrup? 
25 MR. DASTRUP: A No. I don't believe so. 
i 
1 
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THE COURT: Now, I'm interested only in a voluijtary 
plea, Mr. Dastrup. Has anyone made any promises to you or 
threats against you for the purpose of obtaining a plea, one 
way or the other, in this matter? 
MR. BROWN: This is a neflotia+*d pjp*T Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Then I'd like to know u/hat 
the plea bargain is, and Mr. Dastrup, you listen to this very 
carefully, please. 
PLEA AGREEMENT 
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, the initial information 
charged the Defendant u/ith more than 100 counts, those counts 
being theft and forgery. Subsequent to the filing of the 
initial information, the State became aware of additional 
evidence with regard to additional felony counts of theft 
u/hich could have been charged. I think it might help the 
Court to be enlightened a little bit as to the circumstances 
surrounding this incident. 
The Defendant was employed as a bookkeeper for 
Peterson, the victim in this action. As the bookkeeper he is 
alleged by the State to have forged a certain number of checks 
and issued those checks to himself and that he was unentitled 
to the funds. In addition, there were various checks which 
were signed in blank by authorized parties of Peterson 
Distributing and then, as a bookkeeper, Mr. Dastrup would 
execute those checks to himself and misappropriate those 
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funds. 
After conferring with Mr. Hunt on behalf of Mr. 
Dastrup, the State agreed to file the Amended Information 
before the Court. Those theft counts that are included in the 
information are an accumulation of the amounts, over six-month 
incremental periods, of all of the checks that u/e are now 
au/are of that Mr. Dastrup misappropriated. However, we do 
have an on-going investigation and we will apprise the Court 
of any additional funds that we've located that have been 
taken by Mr. Dastrup. 
The State has agreed to file the information before 
the Court, charges 18 counts in return for a plea of guilty by 
the Defendant. And also, our understanding is that we will 
present to the Court such additional amounts as we find during 
the on-going investigation and that those amounts will be 
included for purposes of restitution. That is the agreement. 
THE COURT: So as I understand your agreement, he's 
to enter a plea of guilty for each one of these counts then. 
MR. BROWN: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is that your agreement, Mr. Hunt? 
MR. HUNT: Yes. Just to declare any additional 
amounts that are found would be just for the purpose of 
restitution. There would be no new charges filed on those. 
THE COURT: Is that your agreement, Mr. Brown? 
25 MR. BROWN: It is, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Now Mr. Dastrup, Counsel have indicated 
a plea bargain and the only way I'll accept this plea bargain 
is on the basis that you admit that you actually committed the 
forgeries and theft that you've been charged with and admit 
the allegations as set forth in the Amended Information on 
each of the particular facts. That's the only way I'll do it. 
I don't want somebody coming in and pleading in my Court to 
something that they didn't do. Do you understand that? 
A Yes. 
Q And likewise, I've instructed the State's Attorney 
in these kinds of cases I want the statement signed by the 
Defendant in writing, and a plea agreement. I assume you have 
that. 
MR. BROWN: We do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I would insist that that likewise be 
executed in open Court and that you initial each one of the 
paragraphs involved. I assume your Attorney has advised you 
of that, Mr. Dastrup. 
MR. DASTRUP: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now, you want me to accept this plea 
bargain then at this time, Mr. Dastrup? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Now Mr. Dastrup, do you admit that you committed 
the forgeries, as set forth in the amended information, and 
committed the thefts on the dates, as set forth in the amended 
PAGE 10 
1 || information? 
II 
2 A Yes f sir. 
3 THE COURT: All right. The record may so show. You 
4 may execute the agreement at this time. 
5 [AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY DEFENDANT AND COUNSEL] 
6 || THE COURT: Now, let me just explain one other 
7 thing, Mr. Dastrup, before you sign this. This Court takes 
8 the position as to what a person is charged with, that's up to 
9 the State of Utah to determine. In other words, the Court 
10 doesn't make charges against anyone, so that's a matter for 
11 the State of Utah to determine. When it gets to the penalty 
12 phase of the case, then that's for the Court to determine. 
13 That's not for Counsel. So while I hear recommendations 
14 concerning the penalty phase, I'm the one that's going to have 
15 to make that determination. You've advised him of that, Mr. 
16 Hunt? 
17 MR. HUNT: I have, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: And you understand that, Mr. Dastrup? 
19 MR. DASTRUP: Yes. I believe so. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you. The record should indicate 
21 that the Court accepts the plea bargain. 
22 The record should indicate that Mr. Dastrup has 
23 executed in open Court a statement of the Defendant concerning 
24 these offenses. I would like him to initial each one of these 
25 paragraphs, Counsel. 
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[INDICATED] 
MR. HUNT: Okay. 
[COUNSEL AND DEFENDANT RESPONDED] 
THE COURT: The record should indicate that the 
State1s Attorney, Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Dastrup have executed a 
plea agreement. 
The Court's of the opinion that the Defendant has 
been advised of his constitutional rights, the consequence of 
the matter before the Court. The Court's of the opinion that 
he intelligently understands u/hy he's here and that his plea 
is voluntary, and the Court approves the plea bargain, as set 
forth by Counsel. 
THE COURT: If you'll please stand, again, Mr. 
Dastrup. 
[DEFENDANT RESPONDED] 
THE COURT: Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 1, 
forgery, a felony in the second degree, what is your plea? 
Guilty or not guilty? 
A Guilty, sir. 
Q The record should indicate Mark Dastrup enters a 
plea of guilty to Count 1. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 2, theft, a felony 
in the third degree, what is your plea? Guilty or not guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The Defendant enters a plea of guilty to Count No. 
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2. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 3, theft, what is 
your plea? Guilty or not guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The Defendant, Mark Dastrup, enters a plea of 
guilty to Count No. 3, theft. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 4, theft, a felony 
in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The record should indicate Mark Dastrup has entered 
a plea of guilty to Count No. 4, theft. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 5, theft, a felony 
in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The record should indicate that Mark Dastrup enters 
a plea of guilty to Count No. 5, theft. 
As to Count No. 6, theft, a felony in the second 
degree, Mr. Mark Dastrup, u/hat1 s your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The record should indicate Mr. Mark Dastrup enters 
a plea of guilty to Count No. 6, theft. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 7, theft, a felony 
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in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The Defendant, Mark Dastrup, enters a plea of 
guilty to Count No. 7, theft. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 8, theft, a felony 
in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The record should indicate that Mark Dastrup enters 
a plea of guilty to Count No. 8. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 9, theft, a felony 
in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The Defendant, Mark Dastrup, enters a plea of 
guilty to Count No. 9, theft. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 10, forgery, a 
felony in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The record should indicate Mark Dastrup enters a 
plea of guilty to Count No. 10. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 11, forgery, a 
felony in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
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g u i l t y ? 
A Gui l ty . 
Q The Defendant enters a plea of guilty to Count No. 
11, forgery. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 12, forgery, a 
felony in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The record should indicate that the Defendant 
enters a plea of guilty to Count No. 12. 
As to Count No. 14, forgery, a felony in the second 
degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The record should indicate that the Defendant 
enters a plea of guilty to Count No. 13. 
As to Count No. 14, Mr. Mark Dastrup, forgery, a 
felony in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The Defendant enters a plea of guilty to Count No. 
14. 
As to Count No. 15, forgery, a felony in the second 
degree, Mr. Mark Dastrup, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
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Q The record should indicate Defendant enters a plea 
of guilty to Count No. 15. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 16, forgery, a 
felony in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The Defendant enters a plea of guilty to Count 16. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 17, forgery, a 
felony in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The record should indicate that the Defendant 
enters a plea of guilty to Count No. 17. 
Mr. Mark Dastrup, as to Count No. 18, forgery, a 
felony in the second degree, u/hat is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
A Guilty. 
Q The record should indicate Defendant enters a plea 
of guilty to Count No. 18. 
What's your recommendation, Mr. Brown? 
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I believe a presentence 
report is appropriate. 
MR. HUNT: We agree, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dastrup, both Counsel have 
requested, before I pronounce sentence, that they u/ould desire 
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to have a presentence investigation; do you have any objection 
to such a procedure? 
A No, sir. 
Q Nou/f it will probably take 30 days, so you'd be 
u/aiving your right to be sentenced inmediately; you understand 
that, don't you? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: At the request of Counsel and at the 
request of the Defendant, this matter is referred to the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence 
investigation and report. Who is going to handle the case? 
[PROBATION OFFICER RESPONDED] 
THE COURT: This gentlemen standing, Mr. Dastrup, is 
my Probation Officer and he will be handling your case. His 
name is Mr. Richard Bagley. He'll be meeting with you, and 
this matter will come before the Court for sentencing on—can 
you do it by the 5th of April, Mr. Bagley? 
MR. BAGLEY: He's local. I can handle it, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. This matter will come before 
the Court for sentencing on the 5th day of April at 10:00 
o'clock a.m. 
Now, Mr. Dastrup, you'll be meeting with my 
Probation Officer immediately, as soon as he can take time to 
talk to you. I would advise you that he'll be making a very 
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detailed investigation report, in writing, to me. So be 
absolutely honest u/ith him and cooperate so he can do the best 
job possible. Now, if you are not honest u/ith him and you 
don't cooperate u/ith him, he's going to put it in his report 
and I wouldn't have any alternative but to take that into 
consideration; do you understand what I'm saying? 
MR. DASTRUP: Yes, sir. 
Q Are you out on bail? Or are you in custody? 
A I'm out on bail. 
THE COURT: Is there any objection if the bond, as 
set by the Magistrate, remains in effect? 
MR. BROWN: No, Your Honor. 
MR. HUNT: None, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. The bond, as set by the 
Magistrate, shall remain in effect and I'll see you on April 
5th for sentencing. 
Listen to me very carefully, Mr. Dastrup. It's the 
further order of this Court that you shall not use intoxicants 
of any type; no wine, no whiskey, no beer. You shall not use 
any illegal drugs. Unless they're prescription medicine given 
to you by a physician, you shall not use them. 
You shall not violate any law of any community, 
state, or nation in which you are located. If you violate any 
law, I'll have to take that into consideration; do you 
understand what I'm saying? 
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1 || MR. DASTRUP: Yes, s i r . 
2 || THE COURT: All r i g h t . Good luck, and u/e'l l see you 
3 || on the day I s t a t e d , the 5th of Apri l . 
4 II [WHEREUPON THE ABOVE ENTITLED PROCEEDINGS WERE 
5 II COMPLETED] 
6 —ooOoo— 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF SEVIER ) 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
I, JOSEPH M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPR, Official Reporter 
for the Sixth Judicial District Court, County of Sevier, State 
of Utah, hereby certify that I did at the time, date and place 
as set forth herein report the proceedings had in stenographic 
notes; that the foregoing pages, numbered 1-19, inclusive, 
constitute a true, correct and complete transcript of my notes 
as reduced to typeu/ritten form by me or under my direction. 
I further certify that I am not an agent, attorney 
or counsel for any of the parties hereto, nor am I interested 
in the outcome thereof. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have subscribed my name and 
affixed my seal this 9th day of September 1989. 
C^JOSEPH^M. LIDdELL, CSfR, RPR 
Notary Public in and, for the 
State of Utah 
[License No. 219-1801-r 
My Commission Expires: 
5-6-90 
—ooOoo— 
ADDENDUM B 
LAWRENCE H. HUNT (3934) 
Attorney for Defendant 
355 West 100 North #200 
P.O. Box 310 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
SEVIER COUNTY 
RECEIVED N 0 . - J £ & L 
'89 RPR 5 PD H 38 
DEVON P0ULS0N. CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
STATE 
THE 
OF 
SEVIER 
UTAH 
JUDICIAL 
Wfiiifi* DEPUTY 
DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK DASTRUP, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
Criminal No. //fa <~ 
COMES NOW, Mark Dastrup, the Defendant in this case and hereby 
acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s): 
<~?tuL. 10 counts of Forgery, a second degree felony, punishable 
by a prison term of 1 to 15 years in the state prison and a fine 
O f $ 1 0
' °
0 0
-
0 0
 I c ^ . O k i l c W , ^ ^ ' ^ ^ 
-244^2. 8 counts of Theft,Ka third degree pelony, punishable bycU^^* 
a prison term of up to 5 years in the state prison and s fine of y^HJ. 
$5,000.00. 
~7fU; I have received a copy of the information against me, I have 
read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) 
for which I am pleading guilty. 
,,i# The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as 
follows: That on the dates set forth in the information I signed 
a name on a check other than my own. Further, that on the dates 
as set forth on the information I obtained control of money 
belonging to another with the intent to deprive the owner of said 
money. 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) 
charged are as follows: That I signed the name of another person 
to a check and obtained money without the owner's permission• 
*vtf) I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
turf) !• I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the Court at no cost to me. 
n <
^ 2 . I have not waived my right to counsel. 
^ 3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, 
my rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my 
plea of guilty. 
/.**> 4. I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
Lawrence H. Hunt, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this 
statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with 
my attorney. 
*"fJ 5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
-><*-6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them 
cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined 
by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to have my 
witnesses subpoenaed at State expense to testify in Court upon my 
behalf. 
^iu^jj 7* I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. 
*7*t£)8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me 
I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for 
trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
2 
~1to4> 9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were 
tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would have the 
right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of Utah and that 
if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs 
would be paid by the State. 
^ 10. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be imposed 
upon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for a prison term, 
fine, or both. I know that in addition to any fine, a 25% 
surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63-9, will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make 
restitution to any victim or victims of my crimes. 
njsQ 11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, 
or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to be more than 
one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
-TH^ ? 12. I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am 
waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the 
preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such plea(s) 
I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct 
alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are 
entered. 
<-m4?13. My plea(s) of guilty is/are not the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney, the promises, 
duties and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this Affidavit. 
7^14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the 
Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to roe as to what 
they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court. 
3 
~^C^15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises, 
except those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement, 
have been made to me. 
—*,^16. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this Affidavit. I 
do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are 
correct. 
^•y^i^n • I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
/l^)18. I am 7 C* years of age; I have attended school through 
the )TTa grade and I can read and understand the English 
language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication 
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea(s) was made. 
I am not presently under the influence of any drugs, medication or 
intoxicants. 
^fi^p 19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 
-THR-
OATED this "7T day of March, 1989. 
-71/las A '/k&/n,,±S 
MARK DASTRUP 
DEFENDANT 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for Mark Dastrupf the 
Defendant above, and that I know he has read the statement or that 
I have read it to him and I have discussed it with him/her and 
believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and 
is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge 
and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing Affidavit, are accurate and true. 
LAWRENCE H. HUNT 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the 
case against Mark Dastrup, Defendant. I have reviewed this 
statement of the Defendant and find that the declarations, 
including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and the 
factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been 
offered Defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in 
the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented 
on record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe 
that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the 
offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of 
the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
6 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and 
certification, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of guilty is 
freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the 
Defendant's plea of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in the 
statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this j~ *" *" day of-MaVeh, 1989. 
DON V-.TI13BS_ _ . 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
7 
ADDENDUM C 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
R. Don Brown #0464 CCVICD A A , , , , . 
Sevier County Attorney S ^ V , E R C 0 ^ T Y 
County Courthouse RECEIVED WO.JZ^r 
Richf ie ld , Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-6812 '89 fifif! 7 Pfl 3 ?c 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIEBEWN^OULSON CLERK 
STATE OF UTAH ^y'liffiVf*-'DEPUTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK DASTRUP, 
Defendant. i Case No. // &> *i 
The undersigned, R. Don Brown, Sevier County Attorney, states on 
information and belief that the Defendant committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I: FORGERY, contrary to Section 76-6-501, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did with a purpose to 
defraud, make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish or 
utter a writing so that the writing purported to be the act of another, to-
wit: Check #8629 written on the account of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc., 
dated April 5, 1985, for the amount of $100.00, the same constituting a Felony 
of the Second Degree. 
COUNT II: THEFT, contrary to Sections 76-6-404 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did obtain or exercise 
unauthorized control over property of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc. having a 
value in excess of $250.00 with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof at 
Richfield City, County of Sevier, State of Utah, during the period from April 
1, 1985, through June 30, 1985, to-wit: $700.00, the same constituting a 
Third Degree Felony. 
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COUNT III: THEFT, contrary to Sections 76-6-404 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did obtain or exercise 
unauthorized control over property of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc. having a 
value in excess of $1,000.00 with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof at 
Richfield City, County of Sevier, State of Utah, during the period January 1, 
1986, through June 30, 1986, to-wit: $4,640.00, the same constituting a 
Second Degree Felony. 
COUNT IV: THEFT, contrary to Sections 76-6-404 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did obtain or exercise 
unauthorized control over property of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc. having a 
value in excess of $1,000.00 with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof at 
Richfield City, County of Sevier, State of Utah, during the period July 1, 
1986, through December 31, 1986, to-wit: $7,280.00, the same constituting a 
Second Degree Felony. 
COUNT V: THEFT, contrary to Sections 76-6-404 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did obtain or exercise 
unauthorized control over property of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc. having a 
value in excess of $1,000.00 with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof at 
Richfield City, County of Sevier, State of Utah, during the period January 1, 
1987, through June 30, 1987, to-wit: $12,783.06, the same constituting a 
Second Degree Felony. 
COUNT VI: THEFT, contrary to Sections 76-6-404 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did obtain or exercise 
unauthorized control over property of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc. having a 
value in excess of $1,000.00 with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof at 
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Richfield City, County of Sevier, State of Utah, during the period July 1, 
1987 through December 31, 1987, to-wit: $1,245.11, the same constituting a 
Second Degree Felony. 
COUNT VII: THEFT, contrary to Sections 76-6-404 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did obtain or exercise 
unauthorized control over property of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc. having a 
value in excess of $1,000.00 with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof at 
Richfield City, County of Sevier, State of Utah, during the period Janauary 1, 
1988, through June 30, 1988, to-wit: $12,330.20, the same constituting a 
Second Degree Felony. 
COUNT VIII: THEFT, contrary to Sections 76-6-404 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did obtain or exercise 
unauthorized control over property of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc. having a 
value in excess of $1,000.00 with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof at 
Richfield City, County of Sevier, State of Utah, during the period July 1, 
1988, through December 31, 1988, to-wit: $22,612.28, the same constituting a 
Second Degree Felony. 
COUNT IX: THEFT, contrary to Sections 76-6-404 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did obtain or exercise 
unauthorized control over property of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc. having a 
value in excess of $1,000.00 with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof at 
Richfield City, County of Sevier, State of Utah, during January, 1989, to-wit: 
$3,355.18, the same constituting a Second Degree Felony. 
COUNT X: FORGERY, contrary to Section 76-6-501, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did with a purpose to 
defraud, make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish or 
Page 4—Amended Information 
State of Utah vs. Mark Dastrup 
utter a writing so that the writing purported to be the act of another, to-
wit: Check #11650 written on the account of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc., 
dated August 30, 1986, for the amount of $700.00, the same constituting a 
Felony of the Second Degree. 
COUNT XI: FORGERY, contrary to Section 76-6-501, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did with a purpose to 
defraud, make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish or 
utter a writing so that the writing purported to be the act of another, to-
wit: Check #11773 written on the account of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc., 
dated September 18, 1986, for the amount of $750.00, the same constituting a 
Felony of the Second Degree. 
COUNT XII: FORGERY, contrary to Section 76-6-501, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did with a purpose to 
defraud, make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish or 
utter a writing so that the writing purported to be the act of another, to-
wit: Check #11853 written on the account of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc., 
dated September 29, 1986, for the amount of $700.00, the same constituting a 
Felony of the Second Degree. 
COUNT XIII: FORGERY, contrary to Section 76-6-501, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did with a purpose to 
defraud, make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish or 
utter a writing so that the writing purported to be the act of another, to-
wit: Check #11898 written on the account of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc., 
dated October 3, 1986, for the amount of $350.00, the same constituting a 
Felony of the Second Degree. 
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COUNT XIV: FORGERY, contrary to Section 76-6-501, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did with a purpose to 
defraud, make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish or 
utter a writing so that the writing purported to be the act of another, to-
wit: Check #12154 written on the account of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc., 
dated December 2, 1986, for the amount of $850.00, the same constituting a 
Felony of the Second Degree. 
COUNT XV: FORGERY, contrary to Section 76-6-501, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did with a purpose to 
defraud, make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish or 
utter a writing so that the writing purported to be the act of another, to-
wit: Check #12179 written on the account of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc., 
dated December 15, 1986, for the amount of $900.00, the same constituting a 
Felony of the Second Degree. 
COUNT XVI: FORGERY, contrary to Section 76-6-501, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did with a purpose to 
defraud, make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish or 
utter a writing so that the writing purported to be the act of another, to-
wit: Check #12230 written on the account of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc., 
dated January 5, 1987, for the amount of $800.00, the same constituting a 
Felony of the Second Degree. 
COUNT XVII: FORGERY, contrary to Section 76-6-501, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did with a purpose to 
defraud, make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish or 
utter a writing so that the writing purported to be the act of another, to-
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wit: Check #12256 written on the account of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc., 
dated January 15, 1987, for the amount of $800.00, the same constituting a 
Felony of the Second Degree. 
COUNT XVIII: FORGERY, contrary to Section 76-6-501, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said Defendant did with a purpose to 
defraud, make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish or 
utter a writing so that the writing purported to be the act of another, to-
wit: Check #12257 written on the account of Kay Peterson Distributing Inc., 
dated January 21, 1987, for the amount of $549.05, the same constituting a 
Felony of the Second Degree. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following 
witnesses: John Evans, Kenley Peterson 
Authorized for presentment and filing on 
the /^ day of March, 1989. 
/Wh .£/*: 
R. DON BROWN 
Sevier County Attorney 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. : 
FRANK DAVID GENTRY, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented for review is whether the 
court of appeals erroneously held that State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strict compliance" with rule 11(5), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which supersedes the "record as 
a whole" test traditionally applied on review to determine 
whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on August 24, 
1990, and appears in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 
Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1990) (a copy of the court's opinion is 
contained in the addendum). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Prank David Gentry, was charged with theft 
by deception, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-
405 (1990), and criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor, under 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-206 (1990). 
After defendant pled not guilty to the charges, trial 
commenced before the district court sitting without a jury. 
After the close of the evidence, but prior to closing arguments, 
defendant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of theft, a 
third degree felony. The State dismissed the criminal trespass 
charge. The trial court stayed imposition of sentence and placed 
defendant on eighteen months' probation. 
Over two months after the acceptance of his guilty 
plea, defendant moved to withdraw it. The trial court denied 
this motion. 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
and remanded the case for a new trial on the original charges. 
State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 24, 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A recitation of the facts of defendant's crimes is not 
necessary for purposes of this petition. The relevant facts are 
those stated above in the Statement of the Case. 
The facts underlying the charges against defendant are 
accurately summarized in the court of appeals' opinion. Gentry, 
141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26-27. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT 
STATE V. GIBBONS, 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987), 
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST 
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant argued, 
inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because "the trial court 
failed to explain to [him] the elements and facts of the crime of 
theft before he pled guilty, and . . • further erred by relying 
on an incomplete record as a substitute for Rule 11 compliancef] 
in determining that [he] entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences." State v. Gentry, 141 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 27. The State responded that, under the "record as 
a whole" test traditionally applied by this Court on post-
conviction review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea, see, 
e.g., Jolivet v. Cook# 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
110 S. Ct. 751 (1990); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 
1988); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per 
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curiam), the trial court had not abused its discretion. 
The "record as a wholeM test was stated in Miller as follows: 
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is 
not critical so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving. 
718 P.2d at 405. 
In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the court of appeals definitively 
rejected the State's argument that the "record as a whole11 test 
applied, concluding that in State v, Gibbons, this Court 
"effectively replac[ed] the 'record as a whole' test with a 
strict Rule 11(5) compliance test in accepting a defendant's 
guilty plea,M Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28—i.e., if the 
trial court has not strictly complied with rule 11(5), the guilty 
plea, although perhaps otherwise voluntary, must automatically be 
vacated. This conclusion misconstrues Gibbons and ignores 
significant language in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons 
opinions of this Court that clearly cuts against the notion that 
Gibbons abandoned the record as a whole tfest for determining the 
voluntariness, and thus validity, of a guilty plea. 
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial 
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the 
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas. Rather, the 
Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on 
the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the 
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that 
"a statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in 
all trial courts in this state is appropriate.H Gibbons, 740 
P.2d at 1312. It then set out the specific requirements for 
taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting 
the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the 
defendant's pleas. Ibid. The Gibbons Court did not even mention 
the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a 
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guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious: the Court was not 
reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness 
of the defendant's pleas. Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion 
that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict 
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons. The Gibbons 
Court simply did not address that issue. 
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons 
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a 
whole test was not modified by Gibbons. For example, in Jolivet 
v. Cook, this Court stated: 
We first address Jolivet's claim that his 
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. 
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns 
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas 
because he did not make findings that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how those elements related to the facts, 
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he 
did not know or understand these things when 
he entered his pleas. 
[Rule 11(5)(d)] requires that before a 
trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must 
find that the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he or she is entering the plea. In Gibbons, 
this Court stated that in making this 
finding, the trial court must ensure that the 
defendant understands "the elements of the 
crimes charged and the relationship of the 
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In 
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that 
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea, 
it must find that the defendant knows of the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. The record clearly shows that at 
the time the guilty pleas were accepted, 
Judge Burns did not make the findings 
required by [rule 11(5)], i.e., that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how these elements related to the facts 
and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. 
However, this Court has held# M[T]he absence 
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical 
so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving." State v. Millerf 718 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985). 
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted). And in State v. 
Copeland, the Court, without citing Gibbons, said: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him." 
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173 
(emphasis in the original). We think the 
most effective way to do this Is to have the 
defendant state-in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding. Although this 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. The test is 
voluntariness. We hold that the record 
demonstrates that defendant admitted acts 
sufficient to justify his conviction of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty. 
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons 
guilty pleas, Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, this Court did 
not note or attach any significance to that fact in either 
opinion, and, in fact, directly applied Gibbons in Jolivet in 
concluding that although the trial court did not strictly comply 
with rule 11, the record as a whole demonstrated that Jolivet 
-6-
entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Jolivet, 784 
P.2d at 1149-51. This seriously undermines the court of appeals' 
effort to distinguish Jolivet and Copeland on the basis that the 
record as a whole test was applied in those cases because they 
3 
involved pre-Gibbons guilty pleas. Significantly, in State v. 
Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), which involved a post-Gibbons 
guilty plea, this Court apppeared to apply the record as whole 
test in reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's 
4 
motion to withdraw. 
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the 
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction 
attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the 
following passage from State v. Kay# 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986): 
A final word on the State's Rule 11 
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's 
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that 
was struck, the State has argued, in effect, 
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty 
pleas should always be voided when the trial 
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The 
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and 
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well. 
This position is shortsighted, for to follow 
It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before 
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined 
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that 
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would 
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672 
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of 
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet 
and should not be followed. 
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The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of 
Smith, having cited it in support of its decision in the instant 
case, Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, and stating directly in 
State v. Pharris, Case No. 890549-CA, slip op. at 8 n.6 (Utah Ct. 
App. Sept. 14, 1990), a case issued after Gentry, that Smith 
applied the "strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons.* 
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse 
than the wrong. If we were to to hold any 
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the 
resultant plea, even when the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendant's, convicted and 
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their 
convictions for purely tactical reasons, 
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas 
corpus long after the fact. We have refused 
to overturn convictions upon such challenges 
in the past, e.g.. State v. Knowlesf Utah, 
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah, 
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no 
reason to encourage such attacks in the 
future• 
Overturning such convictions—which we 
would have to do if we embraced the rationale 
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's 
concurring opinion—would require the State 
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably 
long after the challenged guilty pleas were 
entered and when the passage of time would 
make reprosecution impractical,'if not 
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate 
result would be to free a number of convicted 
persons for nothing more than technical 
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary 
guilty pleas. 
717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . This view is consistent 
with the harmless error rule long recognized by this court in a 
variety of contexts. See, e.g., State v. Johnson# 771 P.2d 1071 
Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than 
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See, 
e.g., United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does 
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived 
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App. 179, 378 
S.E.2d 520 (6a. App. 1989) (where defendant was otherwise 
informed of rights waived, harmless error standard is applied to 
trial court's failure to comply with rule governing taking of 
pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 N.W.2d 781, 
783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a wholeH demonstrated that plea 
was made knowingly and voluntarily); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 
9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983) (voluntariness of plea determined 
by considering all relevent circumstances surrounding it, not by 
judge's ritualistic recitation of rights waived). 
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(Utah 1989) (harmless error standard for nonconstitutional 
error); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with 
respect to certain constitutional errors, we must place on the 
State the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt"). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Interestingly, the court of 
appeals did not so much as mention Kay, even though the State 
cited the foregoing quoted language from Kay to it in its brief. 
See State v. Gentry, Case No. 890145-CA, Br. of Appellee at 17-
18. 
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's 
pre- and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of 
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a 
whole test with a strict compliance test. A strict compliance 
test is not required either by Gibbons or logic. 
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because 
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law 
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court. Utah R. App. 
P. 46(b). Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on 
review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in 
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court 
of appeals has decided an important question of law which should 
be settled by this Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(d). 
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